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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and 
E'DNA PATTERSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MAX WILCOX and 
BEN D. BROWNING, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 9278 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action involves title to the m'inera}l rights 
of 400 acres of land situated in Township 31 South, 
Range 26 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, San 
Juan County, Utah. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, George P'atterson 
and Edna Patterson, his wife, commenced this ac-
tion against the appellants, Max Wilcox, Ben D. 
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Respondents Patterson did not introduce any 
evidence of their title. 
The evidence of title in Wilcox and Browning, 
appellants, appears from defendant's exhibit 1, (re-
produced herein for reference), which is a quit 
claim deed from respondents George Patterson and 
Edna Pa:terson, his wife, to Max Wilcox. Wi)lcox 
testified that he and his wife delivered a quit claim 
deed to appellant Ben D. Browning to an undivided 
one-half interest in the minerals conveyed to appel-
lant Wilcox by respondents, Patterson. (TR. 36). 
This case presents a single question for re-
view by this Court; n·amely, the construction and 
effect of the quit claim deed by Patterson to Wilcox 
(defendant's exhibit 1). 
In the lower Court the respondents directed 
their attack toward the circumstances surrounding 
the consideration for the deed rather than the in-
tent of the parties or the provisions of the deed. They 
attempted to rescind the deed and an attendant 
agreement (defendant's exhibit 2), for alleged mis-
representations of apperlants. 
In this connection the evidence showed that 
an agreement (defendant's exhibit 2) was entered 
into between appe'llant, Max C. Wilcox and respon-
dent, George Patterson, wherein it was provided for 
the conveyance of certain unpatented mining claims 
and "all the mineral rights" to 400 acres of land 
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for a consideration of $5,000.000 cash and 5,000 
shares of stock at par value of $1.00 per share in 
a corporation to be formed. Ben D. Browning, one 
of the appellants, paid to George 0. Patterson the 
sum of $5,000.00 in cash on April 28, 1955. On 
July 17th, 1955, a certificate of stock in Plateau 
Mining Corporation, representing 5000 shares at 
the par valtle of $1.00 per share, was delivered to 
respondents Patterson by appellant Wilcox. This 
corporation had been formed on February 28, 1955 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Nevada. Respon-
dents contended that the fact that the corporation 
had been formed prior to execution of the agree-
ment (Defendants' Exhibit 2) amounted to mis-
representation and thus entitled them to rescind the 
agreement and the deed. However, the evidence 
showed that the date of incorporation is part of 
the corporate seal of Plateau Mining Corporation 
and this seal was clearly affixed to the stock certi-
ficate. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A"). Respondents 
or their agent had possession of the stock certificate 
for approximately four years and therefore, had the 
means of knowing the date of incorporation for 
some four years before they commenced this action. 
(Tr. 22). Appellants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint at the conclusion of their case on the fol-
lowing grounds: ( 1) That the action was barred by 
the three year statute of limitations (78-12-26 
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U.C.A. 1953), (2) that no material or other mis-
representation of fact had been made to respon-
dents and, (3) that respondents never had offered 
to restore the status quo, name'ly to return the 
$5,000.00 cash consideration which they had re-
ceived. (Tr. 52). The court then stated: 
"I am of the opinion and so hold that the 
comp'laint, the amended complaint of the plain-
tiff should be and is dismissed. Even if it be 
conceded that the provisions in the contract 
relative to the formation of the corporation 
is a material provision of the contract, it 
seems to me that if that is the only fraud 
that can be shown, that the statute of limi-
tations applies and the action is barred by 
the provisions of the statute cited to the court 
which I need not mention because counsel are 
both familiar with them . . . I don't think 
there was any intent on the part of the, there 
isn't any intent on the part of the defendant 
shown by the evidence at any rate to deceive 
in any way the plaintiff. I don't think I need 
say more, gentlemen." (Tr. 53). 
This ruling of the court is reflected in the 
findings of the court. (R. 75). Respondents have 
not appealed from the order of court dismissing 
their amended complaint, and hence, the allegations 
of that complaint and issues raised thereby are not 
before the court on appeal. We burden this brief 
with a recital of the action of the lower court in 
regard to respondents' amended complaint merely 
to show the background of this action and to fur-
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ther show that the entire case of respondents was 
devoted to attempting to focus the attention of the 
lower court on matters which proved to be without 
substance, and to thus avoid the real issue in the 
case, namely the effect of the quit claim deed (De-
fendants' Exhibit 1). 
At the close of respondents case and upon the 
dismissa'l of their amended complaint, the sole issue 
remaining was whether as against respondents, ap-
pellants had title to "all the mineral rights" includ-
ing oil and gas underlying the 400 acres of land 
n1entioned and described in the quit claim deed. 
The lower court in its memorandum decision ruled 
that appellants did not and construed the deed as 
severely restricting the grant therein contained. 
( R. 68) . This brief will show that the court erred 
in this regard and that its decree in this particular 
must be reversed. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' TITLE TO ALL THE MINERALS 
INCLUDING OIL AND GAS UNDERLYING THE 400 
ACRES DESCRIBED IN DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "A" 
(QUIT CLAIM DEED) IS GOOD AND VALID AND 
THE DECREE OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING 
OTHERWISE IS ERR·OR. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' TITLE TO ALL THE MINERALS 
INCLUDING OIL AND GAS UNDERLYING THE 400 
ACRES DESCRIBED IN DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "A" 
(QUIT CLAIM DEED) IS GOOD AND VALID AND 
THE DECREE OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING 
OTHERWISE IS ERROR. 
The sole question before the court is to deter-
mine what was conveyed by the quit claim deed. 
The answer to that question depends on the intent 
of the parties as shown by the deed. The terms of 
the deed and the words of grant are clear and un-
an1biguous. 
Briefly summarized, the deed states and con-
veys: 
( 1) 30 mining claims. (1) 
(2) "All mineral rights" to the follow-
ing· named parcels of land. (The 
legal description follows) 
( 3) An .e,asement for the purpose of 
mining said properties and con-
ducting all operations incidental 
thereto including, but not limited 
to, ex]!loration, development and 
surveytng. 
Each of the words of grant are consistent with 
the removal of oil and gas, and there is no sugges-
tion that the parties intended otherwise. 
( 1) The 30 mining claims are not an issue in this case. They were 
unpatented claims and by Federal law oil and gas is not subject 
to location under the n1ining laws. 30 U.S.C. §193. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The meaning attributed by 'law to the term 
"mineral rights" includes extraction of oil and gas. 
NOTE: The term ''mineral right'' ordinarily em-
braces oil and gas, 58 C.J.S. Mines & Min-
erals §2b ( 4). 
"Unless it appears in a particu1l'ar case 
that it is used in a more restricted sense, the 
term "mineral" ordinarily embraces oil or 
petroleum and natural gas''. 
NOTE : The term "mining" includes the extraction 
of oil and gas, 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals 
§3C (2). 
'' ... In accordance with the recognition of 
oil and gas as minerals as discussed supra 
§2b ( 4) , and by common usage, the extraction 
or production of oil or gas from the earth is 
now generally regarded as mining, ... ". 
The terms exploration, dev.eloprnwnt and s~trvey 
are each terms of general meaning and are applic-
able to the extraction of oil and gas. 
This Court has held (and settled the question 
in this state) that oil and gas was included in a 
reservation of ... "·atl coal, gold, silver, lead, cop-
per and other precious and valuable ores, n1inerals, 
mines and mining rights." See Western Develop-
ment Company vs. Nell, 288 Pac. 2d 488 (Utah). 
Certain of the rulings in tl1e \\r estern Develop-
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"\Vhile it is true that the absence of re-
ferences to rights and privileges connected 
with oil developn1ent has been held to demon-
strate a lack of intention to convey gas and 
oil, (citing cases) the modern trend is ap-
parently to give greater weight to the strict 
definition of the term 'minerals" and to in-
terpret the easements appropriate to mining 
as merely additional surface rights." 
''The trial court admitted the extrinsic 
evidence offered by appellants, but determined 
the issue of intent against them. The burden 
of persuasion remained with the parties who 
asserted that the grantor in both deeds here 
under consideration intended to convey less 
than the estate attributed by law to the word 
"minerals", and hence, we must examine that 
evidence to determine whether or not it is of 
such substance as to compel a finding that oil 
and gas rights were not intended to be in-
cluded in the reservation and grant." 
"All the evidence introduced was equi-
vocal in its meaning, and thus appellants have 
failed to prove by extrinsic evidence that the 
intention of the parties was other than to 
grant what is genera'l'ly accepted as within 
the term 'minerals." 
The burden of persuasion throughout the trial 
remained with respondents Patterson to show that 
their gran't meant less than the estate attributed 
by law to the term 'mineral rights", and this they 
did not do ; that burden was never even undertaken 
by respondents, let alone satisfied. The ruling of 
the Western Development vs. Nell supra, compelled 
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the lower court to find that the estate conveyed by 
respondents is all substances legal'ly cognizable as 
minerals, including oil and gas. 37 ALR 2d 1440. 
The lower court recognized the rule that a 
conveyance of "minerals" or "mineral rights" in-
cludes oil and gas? The court so stated in its mem-
orandum decision. 
"I recognize the rule that unless a con-
trary intention is manifested, (2) the term 
"mineral" or 'mineral rights" include gas 
and oil". (R. 69). 
How then did the lower court arrive at its 
erroneous conclusion that grantors coveyed an es-
tate less than "all minerals", including gas and oil? 
The record discloses only two possible sources for 
such a conclusion, neither of which support it; one 
item being the grazing lease entered into by respon-
dents Patterson and appellant Wilcox more than 
three years after delivery of the deed, the second 
being the royalty reservation contained in the deed. 
See Paragraph 7 of the Findi11g of Fact (R. 75) 
and the court's memorandum decision (R. 68). 
(2) "Manifest is a very strong word, a degree stronger than than 
'evident', the mind getting the truth as by an intuition. It is 
defined as meaning . 0 o obvious to the mind or to the under-
standing; plain; open; unmistakable; indisputable ... ". 55 
CoJ .S. p. 6220 
10 
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First, the "grazing lease". 
It is dated October 1, 1958, more than three 
years subsequent to the execution of the quit claim 
deed and cannot be considered a contemporaneous 
instrument. Paragraph 4 of the lease (R. 95) con-
tains the language relied on by respondents in re-
gard to intent. It states: 
"It is further understood and agreed that 
this lease does not include any mineral rights 
whatsoever and that the Lessors specifically 
reserve the right to occupy so much of the 
surface of the demised premises as may be 
necessary or convenient for any mining op-
erations conducted by Lessors or those acting 
by their authority, and that no compensation 
will be paid to Lessee for such right.'' 
This lease neither referred to, nor cancelled, 
nor amended . the quit claim deed conveying "a:Il 
1ninerals." It's simple effect must be to clarify the 
lease to the extent that no mineral rights passed by 
the terms of the lease. To give it effect as qualify-
ing the deed woud require a conclusion that "all 
minerals" co11veyed by the deed were cancelled by 
the lease. Such construction of the lease seems wholly 
inconsistent with the 'lease provision ... "this lease 
does not include any mineral rights." 
The lease language, rather than casting doubt 
1tpon the deed, merely r-ecognizes its existence and 
harmonizes tl~e prior acts of the parties. 
Furthermore, the grazing lease covers approxi-
11 
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m·ately 3000 acres of land owned by respondents in 
the same general area as that described in the deed. 
The deed conveys all minerai rights to only 400 acres 
of land. When seen in this context, the paragraph 
quoted above assumes its proper proportion and 
shows recognition of rights not only embraced in the 
quit claim deed but perh·aps other grants by respon-
dents or rights not yet conveyed by respondents. 
12 
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The Rcsc;·vatio?~ of Royalty 
The lower court in Paragraph 7 of the Find-
ings of Fact states: 
" ... That from the face of said unre-
corded quit claim deed itself, the use of the 
term "mineral rights" it was intended to in-
clude only minerals and ores that were to be 
treated by m1lls and against which there was 
haulage allowance and penalty for high lime 
contents, namely, uranium, thorium, vana-
dium and other fissionable source 1naterials 
and all associated and related minerals and 
did not cover and include other minerals such 
as oil and gas with the premises." 
The deed granted "a'll mineral rights" to (legal 
description follows). The royalty reservation states: 
''Grantors further reserve the right and 
impose an obligation upon these properties to 
t~1e extent of 10 ro of all minerals reserved 
by this deed as determined by gross mill re-
ceipts, less haulage allowance and pena1lties 
for high lime content. Said ore payment 
to terminate when such payment shall be paid 
in the sum of $5,000,000.00." 
In the absence of ambiguity the court was re-
quired to give full force and effect to the plain 
n1eaning of the deed. When the court failed to hold 
that gas and oil was included in this deed, such con-
clusion is in direct conflict with the granting clause 
of "all minera1l rights" and had the effect of re-
making the deed between the parties. The only 
13 
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source in the deed from which the court could have 
reached such a conclusion comes from 'the reserva-
tion of royalty. It is obvious that the lower court 
concluded that the royalty reservation reflected an 
intention of the parties to convey those minerals and 
ores treated by mills and concluded that this ex-
cluded gas and oil minerals. To reach this result the 
court has construed this deed most favorab'ly to the 
grantor and against the grantee. A reasonable con-
struction of the deed giving full effect of the grant-
ing clause of "all mineral rights" would have been 
to construe the royalty reservation to impose 107o 
royalty on all minerals reserved by the deed after 
deducting all allowa11ces and penalties for high lime 
content and as to the minerals not subject to mill-
ing, haulage, and high lime content there would be 
no royalty. To construe this granting clause as be-
ing modified by the reservation is to extend the 
reservation beyond its terms. The rule of construc-
tion applicable to reservations is found in 26 C.J.S. 
Deeds, sec. 140 ( 1) : 
''A reservation or exception will be given 
effect according to the p'lain meaning and in-
tent of the language used. What was reserved 
must be determined from a construction of 
the reservation clause, which is to be construed 
more strictly than a grant. It cannot be ex-
tended beyond its terms." 
The fact that it is not permissable to construe 
14 
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a deed more strongly in favor of the grantor against 
the grantee is found in 26 C.J.S. Deeds, sec. 140(2): 
" ... as a general rule, reservations and 
exceptions expressed in a doubtful manner 
are, conformable to the rule applicabte to 
deeds generally, ... construed most strongly 
against the grantor and in favor of the gran-
tee." 26 C.J .S. Deeds, sec. 140 ( 2). 
Nothing in the record, nothing in the dPrcl ~11il 
no rule of construction will permit the royalty reser-
vation to override and destroy the grant. 
The reservation of royalty presents the ques-
tion of what minerals are subject to royatty and 
not whether the reservation affects the clear and 
unequivocal terms of the grant. 
The key words in the clause are "mill receipts" 
and "ore". They are defined in 'law. 
Milling 
"In mining parlance, the process of sep-
arating the materials found together, and ex-
tracting from the mass the particular natural 
product desired." 58 C.J.S. §3, Page 49. 
Ore 
''The term ore designates the compound 
of a metal 'and some other substances; a metal-
liferous mineral or rock. It is generally re-
garded as a mineral." 58 C.J.S. §2 ( 5). 
"Less haulage allowance and penalty for high 
15 
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lime con'tent"merely define the method of comput-
ing the net royalty. (3) 
The only platlsible construction of the royalty 
reservation is that respondents reserved ten (lOra) 
percent of metalliferous ores produced from the 
mining claims and the 400 acres, computed on the 
basis of net mill returns free of development and 
haulage costs. The trial court evidently adopts this 
view as to the nature of respondent's royalty. 
We again state that the court's finding from 
the royalty reservation of an intent not to convey 
oil and gas extended the reservation beyond its p1ain 
terms and beyond all rules of construction. 
Even if it were conceded for the purpose of 
argument that the reservation is ambiguous (the 
grant concededly is not), when the deed is viewed 
in the light of settled rules of construction the total 
effect is still a grant of "all mineral rights" in-
cluding oil and gas. 
The rule fol'lowed in this State is that the whole 
deed will be considered and effect given to all its 
terms. Coltharp vs. Coltharp, 160 Pac. 121 (Utah, 
Wood vs. Ashby, 253 Pac. 2d 351 (Utah), Haynes 
vs. H~tnt, 85 Pac. 2nd 861 (Utah). 
( 3) The trial court in its men1orandum decision states that it is a 
m~atter of common knowledge that those terms referred to pro-
cesses and practices re}ative to the extrac·tion of uranium and 
vanadium. If that be a fact, we do not learn it from the record 
and the court was not asked by respondents to take judicial 
notice of any matter. The decision of the trial court should 
have been ba:sed upon matters of evidence presented by the 
parties and made a part of the record. 
16 
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With this rule in n1ind and giving effect to the 
ordinary meaning of the wo1·ds used, it is still ap-
parent that the estate conveyed includes oil and gas. 
Other settled 1·ules of construction point un-
erringly to the same result 
"It is generally conceded tha't a deed is to 
be construed most strongly against the gran-
tor and most favorably to the grantee." Wood 
vs. Ashby (supra). 
"The general rule is well settled tha't if 
there is any ambiguity in a deed so that it 
is capable of two possible constructions, one 
of which will be more favorable to the grantee, 
the other of which will be more favorable to 
the grantor, that method of construction 
which will be more favorab'le to the grantee 
will be selected and the deed will be construed 
against the grantor." 16 Am. Jur. Deeds 
Seco 1C5. 
See also 16 Am. Jur. Deeds Sections 170 and 
171. 
The same rule applies to the construction of 
the royalty resrvation. 
"A reservation or exception will be given 
effect according to the plain meanjng and in-
tent of the language used. What was reserved 
must be determined from a construction of 
the reservation clause, which is to be con-
strued more strictly than a grant. It cannot 
be extended beyond its terms." 26 C.J.S. 
(Deeds) Sec. 140 ( 1). 
" ... as a general ru'le, reservations and 
exceptions expressed in a doubtful manner 
are, confarmable to the rule applicable to 
17 
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deeds generally, . . . construed most strongly 
against the grantor and in favor of the gran-
tee." 26 C.J.S. (Deeds) Sec. 140(2). 
"Also, in virtue of the rule that a grant 
is construed most strongly against the gran-
tor when the language of an exception or 
reservation is ambiguous or doubtful, it will 
be construed in such way as to resolve doubts 
against the grantor in favor of the grantee, 
for the grant wilt not be cut down by the sub-
sequent reservation to any extent beyond that 
indicated by the intention of the parties as 
gathered from the whole instrument." 16 Am. 
Jur. Deeds, §309. 
One further observation. The contention was 
made in Western Development Company vs. Nell 
(supra) tha:t the fact that oil and gas development 
was of minor importance in this state in 1916 dem-
onstrated that the parties did n(jt have these miner-
als in mind when the deeds were made. The court 
said: 
"It appears to us that the mere fact that 
a particular mineral had not been discovered 
in that vicinity would not preclude the grant-
ing of right2 to such a mineral or limit a 
grant of 'minerals' to something less general 
than all the substances legally cognizable as 
minerals." 
The quit claim deed was made in April, 1955. 
A major oil field was discovered at Aneth, San 
Juan County~ Utah in 1954. This lends compelling 
force to the fact that the parties intended that the 
grant of "all mineral righ'ts" included oil and gas. 
18 
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CONCLUSION 
In this action it was incumbent upon respon-
dents to prove that they intended to convey an 
estate less than that contemplated by the term "all 
minerall rights". This, they did not, indeed, could 
not do. 
The plain unmistakenable terms of the deed 
show that "all mineral rights" had been conveyed 
to appellants, subject only to a 10 ro royalty on 
metalliferous ore produced from the mining claims 
and the 400 acres of fee title land. 
The findings and decree of the lower court 
holding that the terms of a grazing lease and the 
terms of the royalty reservation show an "inter-
pretation" and intent not convey oi'l and gas are 
not founded on substantial evidence or any evidence 
whatsoever and must be reversed. 
This court should instruct that a decree be 
entered quieting appellant's title to "all mineral 
rig·hts" subject only to respondents 10 ro royalty 
on metalliferous ore free of development and haul-. 
age cost. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorney for Appellants 
1307 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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De!~:"c!an~ fx~~ .•••• .L ...•.. C!~'! No. 
_ ___nt.n ~.d3}' or ___ _b __ .__ ' 
, .. · -~'-4..C 
Recorded at Request of _________ . ·---------.-------. ------------
----------------------eter k or lh:: 7Ui Judldii J••Vicl Court •• 
at _____ • M. Fee Paid $----- ---------------------
by ____________ _ Dep. ~Book-....._ __ Pase--- Ref.: _____ _ 
Mail tax notice to ------------A~-------------------
QUIT -CLAIM DEED 
GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and ED~ L. PATTERSON, his wife 
pmtor s 
of Moab Mli«~lldx 
MA.X C. WILCOX 
Grand 
, State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
grantee 
of Moab, Grand County 1 State of Utah for the sum of 
Ten and no/100----------------------------------------------~LLAJS 
the following described tract of land in Sa a Juan County, 
State of Utah: 
30 Mining claims, designated Lower Valley, Nos. I through 30 
all located in R 26 E, 31 S, Salt Lake Meridian, as further ftJ,n 
by the official reo rds of the San Juan County Recorder. Re-
serving, nevertheless, surface rights to the grantors. And, 
all mineral rights to the following named parcels of land, to 
wit: "SEiNEt; NE~SEt; SEtSEt; Section 8, and NWL; NltSWt 
Section 9 Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian" Commonly known as the 
W.H. Coefield property. And, 
"The East t of th~ Northeast Quarter of Section 
Seventeen in Township 31 South, Range 26 cast, 
Salt Lake Meridian." Containing 80 acres. 
Together with an easement of way to the grantee ol his assigns 
to the above described parcels of property for the purpose of 
mining said properties and conducting all operations incidental 
thereto including but not I imited to exploration, development 
and surveying. 
Gr a n t or s f u r t h e r r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t an d i mp o s e • n o b I i g a t i on 
upon these properties to the eatent of ten percent of all 
minerals reserved by tbis deed as determined by grossmill 
receipts less haulage allowance and penalties for high lime 
content~ said ore payment to terminate when such payments 
shall be paid in the sum of $5,ooo.ooo.oo 
fifty t ve. 
clay of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
On the 
thousand nine hundred and 
clay of 
penoaally appeued before me 
A. D. oae 
the signer of the foresoina inltrummt, who claly ICbcnrleclae to me mat he 
same. 
My COIDIDission apira Addn.: 
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